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The European Union (EU) has forged consensus around a 
common response to the economic crisis caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 1).1 This response has 
significantly complemented the likewise resolute reaction 
of monetary policy. Particularly notable among the various 
initiatives approved is the creation of the Next Generation 
EU (NGEU) recovery tool, set out in greater detail in 
Chapter 2 of this Report. Though temporary, this 
programme is an unquestionable milestone in the Union’s 
integration project, as it contains unprecedented elements 
of pooled solidarity and accountability.2 
This ambitious response – reflecting partly the lessons 
learned in previous crises – has evidenced the EU’s 
capacity for resolve and joint action. But it has also 
highlighted the need to continue strengthening its 
economic governance. This box sets out some of the 
main courses of future action needed to reinforce the 
European economic and financial architecture.
One such area for action of particular significance is the 
reform of European fiscal rules. In February 2020, the 
European Commission (EC) launched a review of fiscal 
governance, which was interrupted by the COVID-19 crisis 
and by the activation of the General Escape Clause (GEC).3 
Adding to the reasons then identified for this review4 – 
among which were the excessive complexity of fiscal 
rules, which has led to a lack of transparency and 
predictability, and their inability to prevent fiscal policy 
procyclicality – is the strong worsening of national public 
finances as a result of the pandemic and the need to 
safeguard public investment.5 According to the EC’s 
proposal, and in order to preserve the fiscal impulse 
needed to entrench the recovery from the current crisis, 
the GEC will not be deactivated until the EU attains its pre-
pandemic level of economic activity.6 However, the review 
of the fiscal rules should be resumed as soon as possible.
Another key component of the reform agenda is the 
creation of a common and permanent fiscal capacity in 
the euro area to address serious adverse shocks. That 
would prevent the European economic policy response in 
these episodes from having to depend essentially on ad 
hoc political agreements.7 This macroeconomic 
stabilisation mechanism would allow a common response 
to both systemic and idiosyncratic shocks, ensuring fiscal 
policy countercyclicality.8 This fiscal capacity might 
consist of an investment support instrument (which would 
contribute to raising the region’s potential growth), the 
funding of common European projects (e.g. in the 
environmental and digital realm) or European 
unemployment insurance.9 Undoubtedly, with a view to 
establishing a permanent instrument of this type, at least 
for the euro area, it will be crucial to take in and draw 
inspiration from the lessons that may be learned from the 
design and implementation of the temporary programmes 
NGEU and SURE (Support to  mitigate Unemployment 
Risks in an Emergency).
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1  For a more detailed description of the various elements of the EU response to the pandemic, see, for example, Banco de España (2020), Chapter 3, 
Annual Report 2019 and L. Guirola, I. Kataryniuk and C. Moreno (2020), “Fiscal policy response to the crisis in the euro area and the United States”, 
Box 2, Economic Bulletin, 4/2020, Banco de España.
2  Chapter 2 of this Report analyses in depth the characteristics and implications of this programme. In addition, see Banco de España (2020), “Next 
Generation EU: main characteristics and impact of its announcement on financial conditions”, and J. J. Pérez (2020), Thoughts on the design of a 
European Recovery Fund, Occasional Paper, no. 2014, Banco de España.
3  See European Commission (2020), “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Economic governance review”, COM(2020) 55 final and “Communication 
from the Commission to the Council on the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact”, COM(2020) 123 final.
4  See Box 4 “The reform of the fiscal surveillance framework in Europe”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2020, Banco de España.
5  See Box 3.4 “The importance of an internationally coordinated fiscal policy response and its interaction with monetary policy”, Annual Report 2019, 
Banco de España, and M. Delgado-Téllez, E. Gordo, I. Kataryniuk and J.J. Pérez (2020), The decline in public investment: «social dominance»’ or 
too-rigid fiscal rules?, Working Paper no. 2025, Banco de España.
6  On current forecasts, this criterion would entail the deactivation of the GEC in 2023. However, once the GEC is deactivated, it may be necessary to 
resort to flexibility in the application of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in those Member States that have not yet recovered the pre-crisis level of 
economic activity. See European Commission (2021), “Communication from the Commission to the Council. One year since the outbreak of COVID-19: 
fiscal policy response”, COM(2021)105 final.
7  See European Fiscal Board (2020), Annual Report 2020.
8  For an analysis of the stabilisation capacity of a centralised fiscal capacity, see P. Burriel, P. Chronis, M. Freier, S. Hauptmeier, L. Reiss, D. Stegarescu 
and S. Van Parys (2020) A fiscal capacity for the euro area, lessons from existing fiscal-federal systems, Occasional Paper no. 2009, Banco de España
9  For an analysis of the macroeconomic consequences of these instruments, see Chapter 4, “Fiscal policy in the euro area”, Annual Report 2016, Banco 
de España.
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THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS. REGULATORY AND FISCAL MEASURES APPROVED BY THE EU
Figure 1




Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)
€672.5 billion
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027
The MFF, worth €1.07 trillion and agreed by the European Council along with the NGEU Recovery Fund, will support invetment in the







EU Budget Amendments for 2020
Added funds to finance medical equipment and vaccine purchases worth €9.3 billion,
and reorientation of cohesion funds to help MSs finance pandemic spending of €65.8 billion
Offers temporary support to mitigate
unemployment risks in an emergency
Financial aid of €90.3 billion approved
for 19 MSs.
€62.5 billion disbursed to 16 MSs
as at 16 March 2021
Regulation adopted by the Council
on 11 February 2021
Support instrument for reforms and
investment undertaken by EU countries
in the form of
 Single market, innovation and digital sector Cohesion, resilience and values  Natural resources and environment
 €132.8 billion €377.8 billion €356.4 billion
 
 
Grants: €312.5 billion Grants
REACT EU: €47.5 billion;
Horizon Europe: €5 billion; InvestEU: €5.6 billion;
Rural Development: €7.5 billion; Just Transition
Fund: €10 billion, and RescEU: €1.9 billion
Loans: €360 billion
Creation of pan-European guarantee fund
for loans to firms
Loans of up to €200 billion for firms,
especially SMEs, throughout the EU
Initial set of projects approved for €40.3
billion as at 28 February 2021
Creation of specific credit line
of aid for MSs
Aid of 2% of GDP of each MS in 2019
Not yet used
Triple safety net: support to employment and workers, firms and EU Governments
€540 billion
Temporary added flexibility to common regulatory frameworks in different areas
Easing of fiscal rules via activation of SGP
escape clause (March 2020)
Temporary framework of State aid
(March 2020 and successive updates)
Anti-crisis banking package (April 2020)




SOURCE: Banco de España, based on EU.
a SURE stands for Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency, and MSs for "Member States".
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Fiscal matters aside, the financing of the NGEU and SURE 
programmes will involve the issuance of a very significant 
volume of euro-denominated pan-European bonds.10 
These issues mark a major step on the road towards a 
European safe asset, although additional measures will be 
required in the coming years for its full development and 
consolidation. In this respect, a European safe asset 
would play a decisive role in weakening the link between 
bank and sovereign risk, promoting the international role 
of the euro11 and fomenting the Capital Markets Union.1213 
Indeed, the latter is a fundamental project – all the more 
so following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
EU – for increasing the integration of European capital 
markets and promoting private risk-sharing channels. 
Along with the need to further financial integration in the 
EU is that of preserving its most valuable economic 
integration mechanism, namely the single market. During 
the COVID-19 crisis, the flexibility of its regulatory 
framework was used to ensure the support of the Member 
States to their economies, e.g. through State aid. However, 
any such national measures must be prevented from 
potentially fragmenting the internal market or undermining 
the level playing field.13 Looking ahead, the internal market 
must adapt to the changing circumstances of international 
competition, so as to preserve its external openness, but 
also to eliminate vulnerabilities. The design of an open 
strategic autonomy strategy seeks to strike this balance 
between the commitment to multilateralism and openness, 
and the goal of making European value chains more 
sustainable and resilient. To prevent certain aspects of 
this strategy from hampering convergence among the 
Member States and distorting the workings of the single 
market, these measures should be accompanied by 
mutual insurance mechanisms guaranteeing the 
necessary internal cohesion.14
The euro area’s financial architecture and crisis-
management framework must also be strengthened. To 
complete the Banking Union requires setting in place a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) with a risk-
pooling component that is as extensive as possible. A 
credible political commitment here would represent a 
decisive contribution to ensuring financial stability in the 
euro area in the short and medium term.15 
As regards the crisis-management and bank resolution 
framework, the approved amendment to the Treaty 
establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is a 
positive achievement in itself as it will be conducive, inter 
alia, to this mechanism becoming the financial backstop 
to the Single Resolution Fund in the resolution of 
significant institutions. However, outstanding issues 
remain, such as the provision of liquidity to institutions in 
resolution, a common regulatory framework for resolution 
in the face of systemic crises and a common European 
procedure for the administrative winding up of credit 
institutions. 
Finally, in the current circumstances, inter-governmental 
responses (as in the case of the ESM), which require 
unanimity for their approval, have been relegated in favour 
of responses firmly anchored in the EU framework.16 It 
might be appropriate here to move forward with the EC 
proposal, backed by the ECB in 2018, to integrate the 
ESM as an EU body, so as to strengthen and cement its 
role in the management of future crises.17
10  See M. Delgado-Téllez, I. Kataryniuk, F. López-Vicente, and J.J. Pérez (2020), Supranational debt and financing needs in the European Union, 
Occasional Paper no. 2021, Banco de España.
11  See P. Hernández de Cos (2019), “The EMU at 20: from divergence to resilience”, opening remarks at the Banco de España Third Annual Research 
Conference.
12  See Box 4, “The Capital Markets Union: New developments”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2020, Banco de España.
13  To achieve a sound and resilient recovery in the EU economy calls for a fully operational and more integrated single market that can redress the 
weaknesses identified during the crisis. See the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union (2020), “A deepened Single Market for a strong 
recovery and a competitive, sustainable Europe”, 11 September.
14  See P. L’Hotellerie, M. Manrique and A. Millaruelo (2021), “Open strategic autonomy in the EU”, Box 5, Economic Bulletin, 1/2021, Banco de España.
15  See P. Hernández de Cos (2020), The European response to the COVID-19 crisis, opening address at the Fundación Internacional Olof Palme 
Conference.
16  See A. Westerhof (2021), Reform of the European Stability Mechanism signed: a landmark achievement fully respectful of EU constitutional and 
institutional limits, EULawLive, Weekend Edition no 50.
17  See European Central Bank (2018), Opinion CON/2018/20, general observations.
